INTRODUCTION
As austerity measures have taken hold across government departments since the financial crisis of the mid-late 2000s, publicly funded legal representation has become an increasingly politicised issue and reducing access to legal aid is one way in which governments have sought to save money. As a practitioner, 1 the changes troubled me but there appeared to be little ability to resist change while maintaining a service for clients. From an academic perspective, * Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QE. l.c.welsh@sussex.ac.uk I am grateful to the interviewees for their time and interest. I also wish to thank Professor Rosemary Hunter FAcSS, Professor Helen Carr and Professor Heather Keating for their comments on earlier drafts of this article, and the anonymous peer reviewers for their detailed and helpful feedback.
adopted by governments since the 1980s requires them to restructure markets, including via contracting schemes.
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Against that background, during the 1990s, the government decided that firms who wished to provide publicly funded advice in criminal proceedings would have to hold a contract for those services issued by the Legal Aid Board, 27 which was replaced in 1999 by the Legal Services Commission ('LSC'). The LSC was charged with developing and maintaining criminal legal aid funds under the Criminal Defence Service ('CDS'). The launch of CDS led to an approximate 15 per cent drop in the number of firms providing legal advice in criminal proceedings, which resulted from the fact that those firms who only conducted a very small amount of criminal defence work were unable to meet the contracting criteria. 28 As franchising regimes were introduced, managerial influences took greater control over criminal defence solicitors, because the contracts devised by the LSC required lawyers to adopt specific working practices which the LSC (not necessarily the firm) regarded as appropriate. This represented a challenge to the lawyer/client relationship, 29 and to lawyers' professional identity, because the contractual terms of the legal aid franchising system appear to place limits on lawyers' ability to make flexible, autonomous decisions. As Sommerlad noted, 'the development of a direct relationship with the state raised the possibility of managerial control over the legal aid sector' 30 as governments made explicit attempts to circumscribe and define lawyers' roles. 31 Wall also notes that such provisions 'are employment conditions which 26 Osborne and Gaebler, op. cit., n.24 27 Hynes and Robins, op. cit., n. provide a mechanism of governance and define a new type of legal professional' 32 who has to work with 'the competing rationalities that arise from the conflicting professional agendas of the groups involved in the process'. 33 Conflict may result from struggles over jurisdiction, 34 arising from the unique public/private position of legal aid lawyers: 35 that is, the question of whether the legal profession or the state is best placed to determine the operation of legal aid.
Government initiatives reflected a neoliberal style agenda in which managerial influences of competitive business practices were applied to public institutions via contracting provisions.
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This move prioritised economy and efficiency over adversarial criminal justice principles and placed the demands of efficiency and case management above the needs of defendants (and victims). I suggest that, via neoliberal philosophy (particularly its manifestation through managerialism), debates about the meaning of access to justice have been lost in concerns about efficiency. These changes challenge the normative features of the profession which had developed in the 1960s, which in turn hinders lawyers' understanding of, and ability to exercise, their professional obligations towards their clients. Indeed, Sommerlad demonstrates that managerialism has led to the exclusion of marginalised welfare citizens (including many defendants) from debates about citizenship, while demands for efficiency and value for money have neglected to consider the complex issues surrounding access to justice. as they are obliged to submit to government demands for efficiency while also attempting to represent their clients' best interests. The data set out below highlights how one group of lawyers feels that its role has been further compromised, and how this has influenced the way that they handle cases.
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FUNDING
The most common form of legally aided representation in magistrates' courts is publicly funded advice, case preparation and representation at court under a Representation Order granted on behalf of the Legal Aid Agency. 50 In order to obtain legally aided representation, an applicant must pass both the merits test and the means test. The merits test is based on the interests of justice, and the test has remained largely unchanged since guidance was given on the criteria in 1966. The criteria are broadly based either on the risk of loss of liberty or livelihood, case complexity or the inability of defendants to properly follow the proceedings. 51 However, in 2006 the administration of the test shifted from court legal advisers to non-legally qualified court support staff 52 amid the executive's concerns that court legal advisers were too 49 Young and Wall, op. cit., n.29 50 Defendants are also entitled to one-off free representation in court (except at trial) for imprisonable offences, or if they appear in custody, under the provisions of the duty solicitor at court scheme. 51 The full criteria are; the case involves a substantial question of law, conviction would be likely to lead to loss of liberty or livelihood, or would cause substantial reputational damage, the defendant may be unable to understand the proceedings or to present his own case due to a language barrier, mental illness, or other incapacity, the nature of the defence requires that witnesses need to be traced, or prosecution witnesses will need to be expertly cross-examined, it is in the interests of someone other than the defendant that the defendant should be represented (Home Office, 'Report of the Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings' (H.M.S.O. Cmnd 2934 1966)) 52 I recall this shift as a practitioner, and the greatest concern appeared to be the delay it would cause in knowing whether legal aid had actually been granted. Of course, that concern can only be stated anecdotally.
often persuaded to grant legal aid so that they would be relieved of some of their duties towards unrepresented defendants.
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The removal of legal adviser discretion in granting legal aid was only one of a number of measures designed to reduce legal aid expenditure. 63 Her analysis highlighted that legal aid sector lawyers have been affected by funding alterations in a number of ways. 64 Sommerlad demonstrates that lawyers felt that reforms reduced their professional autonomy and ability to use discretion (both key features of professional identity 65 ), that they were increasingly being made subject to intrusive surveillance, and that they were cynical about quality initiatives;
particularly as 'partners are propelled into ever greater cost consciousness'. 66 As such, Sommerlad argued that changes to the structure of legal aid provision in terms of rationalisation, increased competition and greater regulation have transformed the 'structure, culture and ethos of the profession'. 67 Gray, Fenn and Rickman's important research suggested that solicitors would tend to react to the reintroduction of fixed fees by reducing the amount of work they did on cases that would clearly not exceed the threshold for a lower standard fee. 68 They also found that firms were splitting case fees where there was more than one charge alleged so that two claims could be made. 69 However, the evidence did not support a theory that solicitors would increase core costs to ensure that cases went beyond the standard fee categories. 70 Stephen, Fazio and Tata's research on the Scottish system found that, following the reintroduction of standard fees, solicitors were putting less effort into conducting cases and were reducing 'expenditure on those activities which are incorporated in the core payment of the standard fee and increasing activities which are outside the core costs and are separately compensated'. 71 This behaviour allowed lawyers to increase the volume of cases taken, thereby demonstrating economically rational behaviour. 72 Tata and Stephen found that solicitors believed remuneration changes meant that they were spending less time on face-to-face contact with clients, and that this caused defence work to be less effective. 73 Further efficiency drives meant that solicitors were increasingly pressurised into dealing with cases in routinized ways. McConville, Hodgson, Bridges and
Pavlovic found that such problems existed in the early 1990s, 74 and that lawyers placed heavy reliance on standardised services provided by non-qualified staff to build relationships because discontinuous service from lawyers (who were mainly court based) was a business is generally associated with a specific organisation or community. The subject of the case study was a particular criminal justice area (as designated by the Ministry of Justice) in an area of South East England. As a result, the research takes an idiographic approach in which the findings cannot necessarily be applied regardless of time and place. 79 I was aware of the potential limitations of conducting a case study which is limited both geographically and temporally, and so I conducted two forms of ethnographic research in an attempt to obtain as holistic a view of that particular case as possible. It should also be noted here that I had been a practitioner in the area of study at the time of conducting this research, which affected both the design of the study and collection of data in ways that I discuss below.
The empirical research consisted of observations followed by semi-structured interviews. The purpose of the observation and interviews was to become 'immersed in a social setting for some time… with a view to gaining an appreciation of the culture of a social group' 80 from a greater distance than I had previously experienced. I conducted the equivalent of 20 days of 76 The As I was keen to analyse the impact of changes to legal aid, the advocates selected for interview must have had experience of summary criminal proceedings both before and after the reintroduction of means testing for publicly funded representation, which was confirmed at the time of interview.
It will be apparent from the above that I had previously worked alongside all of the advocates that I interviewed. 89 While this meant that I had to be careful to remain reflexive about my role, it also brought several benefits. I was able to gain access to interview prosecutors with relative ease. I do not doubt that this was partly as a result of my familiarity with the courts I was examining; I was viewed as a familiar and trusted face -someone who was already a member of the workgroup and could consider the workgroup's interests. This meant that I was able to examine the issues from both sides of the adversarial system. As Kemp says, it is important that the effects of policy are understood, especially at a local level and on a 'whole system' basis.
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The interviews were separated into two sections, with one set of questions about legal aid and another about magistrates' court practices more generally. It was important that elements of the interviews were structured in order to obtain comparable data, but respondents were also encouraged to explain their opinions as they felt appropriate. 91 Interviewees were asked outright if they felt that the reintroduction of means testing had any effect on proceedings in the magistrates' court. I also asked questions about whether they conducted work when payment was uncertain because I had observed behaviour (during the first stage of empirical research) which suggested that issue arose. Participants were also asked what they thought 89 I did not, however, interview my former colleagues within the firm that I had worked for because I felt that I was too familiar with the firm's procedures and client matters to be able to conduct an impartial interview. 90 Kemp, op. cit., n.54 91 This is similar to the approach adopted in Sommerlad, op. cit., n.9 generally about the fee structure in relation to legally aided representation. In terms of magistrates' court practices, interviewees were asked about the effect of policies designed to improve efficiency and about lawyer/client relationships. I transcribed the interviews then thoroughly read and re-read the transcripts to identify themes and subthemes via 'recurring motifs in the text' 92 which were then used to categorise and organise the data. However, it must also be remembered 'that all accounts from interview can only be understood in the context of the interview and any information given cannot be taken to mean the 'truth'' 93 because they may simply reflect an account of after the event rationalisations.
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Despite the limitations set out above, the fact that my data is relatable to similar studies does suggest that the propositions advanced have broader applicability across the summary criminal justice system. As such, it may be possible to tentatively suggest that these findings provide, as Sommerlad did, 'an insight into the possible impact of the reforms' 95 in the context of change since 2010, particularly when one takes into account the reliance placed on discursive professional practice in this field.
THE EFFECT OF FIXED (STANDARD) FEES ON DEFENCE SERVICES
During the 1960s, the government had decided that the fairest way to pay advocates was by hourly rate. However, as noted above, fixed fees were reintroduced in the 1990s as a result of concerns that legal aid costs had risen by 300 per cent. Seven of the twelve defence solicitors interviewed expressed an opinion about the level of payment received under the fixed fee scheme. Most of those interviewees indicated that the fixed fee payment scheme was in principle acceptable -either because 'on average it pans out' because the difficult cases are subsidised by the straightforward ones, 100 or because the level is 'about right when you can get legal aid'. 101 Interviewee O said that the system is 'not great but it's, I guess it's OK' because it is possible to break out of the fixed fee system and be paid per hour in lengthy or complicated cases -the non-standard fee. 102 All of these issues were considered by interviewee F, who summarised the situation as follows:
'I think that the fee structure at the moment is not too bad… I understand entirely the logic behind standard fees… in any standard fee situation, there are going to be cases where you lose and there will be cases where you win. It's not ideal, obviously I'd prefer to be paid for everything I do, but that would also mean that there would be some cases where I would be putting in a bill for less than £50... I think that it is a very good thing when you go outside standard fees you are paid for what you do and that is looked at by the Legal Aid Agency and they will tax it down if they think you're billing stuff that you shouldn't be billing for because that 99 Sommerlad, op. cit., n.17, p183 100 Interview A at 4. This provides an example of 'swing and roundabouts' logic described above. In contrast, interviewee C described the profession as 'on its knees' due to the fact that there has been no rise in the fees paid since the late 1990s and payment rates are too low. 104 Kemp also found that solicitors asserted that they 'were not adequately paid for the services they provided and they felt this would have a detrimental impact on the quality of service'.
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Interviewee K was similarly disparaging in saying:
'Fixed fees in the magistrates' and Crown court act, can act as a disincentive to do work thoroughly and properly… I think the whole system is underfunded and does not act as an incentive to more or less provide quality and good service. 
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Of those defence solicitors who did acknowledge that payment via fixed fee could mean that less time would be spent on case preparation than if hourly rates were paid, three were keen to say that the system did not affect the way that they personally work, while also acknowledging that their resources are stretched. The remaining defence solicitors tended to acknowledge that fixed fees provide a disincentive to put in extra work on a case, but in general terms -such as by saying 'it's human nature, you try and do as little as you can get away with and I think that's the big fault of the fixed fee system' 109 -rather than indicating that it affected their behaviour personally. This supports Newman's finding that lawyers were concerned to process cases as quickly as possible because, in order 'to sustain themselves, many lawyers insisted that they were forced to compromise their behaviour'. 117 However, unlike Newman, who said 'lawyers did not provide any discernible sense of regret at behaving in the manner they did', 118 my interviewees described themselves as 'torn' between their duties to the client and business needs. In their after-the-event accounts, they expressed insight into the difficulties this can cause defendants in that they described a temptation to 'cut corners' or perform as little work as possible in order to maximise profit.
These comments appear to specifically undermine the (supplier-induced demand) theory that lawyers provide unnecessary services in order to maximise income by claiming higher fees.
Instead, and in line with managerial demands for efficiency, my findings and those of other studies suggest that lawyers seem to generally work to volume. This supports the findings of In line with above-mentioned concerns about reduced respect for autonomous professional decision making, the behaviours which appear to be reflected in the data suggest that changes to legal aid policy have succeed in transforming 'traditional value rationality into an instrumental calculative rationality'. 121 This may have been achieved by undermining solicitors' ability to act according to values traditionally espoused by public sector professionals. 122 Such behaviours could also be described as a shift away from ethical rationalities (based on normative beliefs that actions are morally good) towards means-end rationalities which are oriented further towards self-interest within given regulatory boundaries. 123 This may undermine lawyers' understanding of their professional role. It is however, important to remember that 'action cannot be understood as simply an adjustment to "given" realities…action motivated by values..' is essential to provide context to behaviour.
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Against that background, advocates expressed that they felt constrained by the business circumstances in which they found themselves, and that this caused some conflict with their professional duties, which could provide evidence of tension between ethically motivated rationalities and environmental moulding. Young and Wall had predicted that the contracting scheme under which standard fees were introduced would mean that firms would struggle to remain profitable, and anticipated that 'if the only way of making a profit under legal aid is to 120 Stephen et al, op. cit., n.71, p213 121 offer hurried, standardised services, then access to justice must suffer' 125 as lawyers are pressurised into dealing with cases (rather than clients) in standardised ways. 126 As such, lawyers are no longer able to clean the criminal process of its impurities by individualising cases, 127 which appears to create a sense of professional discomfort. Tata's research also confirms that lawyers often struggle to 'interpret and reconcile the apparently competing demands of client interests on the one hand and self-interest on the other'. 128 Again, my findings provide support for that argument, which raises issues about professional self-image.
Advocates did express some discomfort with their position, which may suggest they feel their ability to act in accordance with professional values is challenged by the competing interests which they must balance. Lawyers suggested that they would prefer to take a more robust, resistant approach to bureaucratic procedures in favour of client-centred approaches 129 if the pressure of running a business were not present. Newman was of the view that lawyers actively embraced the working patterns encouraged by fixed fees, and that this was demonstrated by a 'clear disregard for their clients'. 130 In contrast to Newman's study, defence advocates that I interviewed appeared to recognise that payment by fixed fee incentivises volume processing of cases over spending a significant degree of time examining the fine details of any given case, and expressed discomfort about such processes. Standardised, hurried case management clearly has the potential to place defendants at significant risk of inadequate access to justice in the proceedings as evidential or legal points may not be identified or pursued. Here exists a clear conflict between lawyers' duties to clients, stakeholders, the legal system and society at large which has been exacerbated by changes to 125 Young and Wall, op. cit., n.29, p12 126 Sommerlad, op. cit., n.17; Newman, op. cit., n.7 127 Tata, op. cit., n6 128 Tata, op. cit., n14 129 McConville et al describe firms who adopt this approach as those which take a political stance and are resistant to policy ideals, as distinct from those who have adopted a more crime control, managerialist stance (McConville et al, op. cit., n.72) 130 Newman, op. cit., n.7, p87 court in late 2012, counsel observed that he thinks more people are appearing without representation since means testing was reintroduced. The legal adviser agreed with that observation and asserted that cases involving defendants appearing without representation take longer to be dealt with. Despite these comments, the proportion of unrepresented defendants remained relatively low. However, it seems that, although levels of representation remain reasonably high, lawyers are not necessarily confident about being remunerated for the service they provide.
MEANS TESTING AND EFFICIENCY DRIVES; UNCERTAINTY FOR LAWYERS
During the course of both observation and interviews (particularly in the latter) it became apparent that solicitors were representing defendants at financial risk to their firm. This appeared to result from the delay caused by the reintroduction of means testing combined with a politically perceived need to act efficiently. As the determination of the means and merits tests moved away from the court arena, advocates could not be sure legal aid would be granted prior to undertaking work required by the court. Three of the seven prosecutors interviewed did not notice advocates working when they were unsure if they would be paid but all of the other nineteen interviewees described this as a relatively common occurrence since the reintroduction of means testing. While defence solicitors predictably had the strongest views about this issue (see below), four of the seven prosecutors interviewed also commented that they had a sense of defence solicitors doing work when they were unsure about payment a lot of the time, or that they had a sense of such behaviour every time they appeared in court. It was clear from the interview data that uncertainty resulted from the fact that solicitors were not necessarily confident that their potential client would pass the means test. Several defence solicitors said that they worked in this way 'all the time', others described it as a daily occurrence and several talked about attempting to secure payment via legal aid in terms of taking a risk or a gamble. Interviewee It must also be recognised that there may be other reasons why solicitors represent defendants on a pro bono basis, including to maintain good working relationships with the court and prosecutors. A high degree of co-operation exists between court personnel, which seems to be crucial to the smooth running of busy courts. Acting in a co-operative way also enables defence solicitors to maintain credibility and therefore remain a member of the exclusive, familiar group of personnel who work in summary criminal courts. 135 Alternatively, by continuing to act in such circumstances, lawyers may be performing a type of 'defiant resilience' 136 in which they try to act in accordance with the habits of their field by emphasising the service-orientated nature of their work. This may be a coping mechanism that enabled them to protect their professional identity despite organisational change.
However, defence advocates recognised that, by taking risks in relation to the likelihood of payment, they are playing into the hands of a system that considers efficiency to be of by defendants as lawyers attempt to resolve the problem of conflicting imperatives through a mixture of compromise and pragmatism.
(IN)EFFICIENCY, DELAY AND CHANGES TO LEGAL AID
As discussed above, the administrative requirements of the legal aid application procedure mean that it is difficult to know if or when legal aid will be granted. Defence solicitors also complained that it might take as long to try to resolve issues with legal aid as it would to actually prepare the case. Three quarters of defence solicitors and five of the seven prosecutors interviewed felt that problems with obtaining legal aid cause delay in summary criminal
proceedings. These problems are however set against an administrative desire to increase efficiency in summary criminal proceedings. Efficiency measures became increasingly important in the criminal justice system as 'managerialism increased its influence over the courts in the late 1980s and early 1990s'. 141 As Faulkner and Burnett note, criticisms about inefficiency in the criminal justice system were in fact based on higher expectations of what the criminal justice system could achieve rather than on any actual deterioration in performance. 142 The concern to ensure efficiency was also manifest in the introduction of the Criminal Procedure Rules (Cr.PR). Their provisions mean that 'magistrates are under constant pressure to avoid unnecessary hold-ups and to be especially wary of granting adjournments unless there are persuasive reasons'. 143 Consequently, defence lawyers appeared to feel that their professional decisions were more likely to be challenged by the court. For example,
Interviewee O expressed annoyance that his assessment about the need for witness attendance at trial would likely be challenged by the court, which wanted the trial to conclude as swiftly as possible. He clearly regarded such challenges as an affront to his professionalism in stating 'You're a professional and you should be treated as one who is competent'.
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The same interviewee went on to express irritation that lawyers' competence is not as highly regarded, or rewarded, as that of other professions. Nearly half of interviewees 145 expressed concern that their professional integrity was being challenged by the fee structure in the context of ever greater demands for efficiency, which caused them to feel demoralised. During the course of my research, defence advocates raised concerns that delay in obtaining legal aid not only means that they cannot start preparing cases as early as they would wish to, but also that the inability to prepare properly means that defendants are sometimes forced into situations which are not necessarily beneficial to them. For example, interviewee B expressed
concern that it was difficult to know how far to take instructions unless or until legal aid is in place and, as interviewee E noted, forcing defendants to enter a plea before the advocate is prepared forces solicitors to advise defendants to enter a not guilty plea, because the burden of proving the case remains with the prosecution. One prosecutor noted that demanding efficiency when legal aid is not in place causes delay at later stages; ' We are told that we should object to an adjournment just so that the defence can get legal aid but it got very difficult for people to sort out their legal aid… forcing a plea always forced a not guilty at an early stage which would have an impact on the case management hearings'.
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Interviewee H, another prosecutor, similarly commented that the reintroduction of means testing 'delays the start of legal aid and therefore delays defence solicitors from taking proper instructions'. 155 Interviewee C commented that the courts require decisions to be made about the conduct of cases at a time when advocates 'don't necessarily have the opportunity to go through the papers as much as we would wish'. 156 Interviewee K expressed some criticism of this behaviour, as noted above, in stating 'means testing delays the grant of legal aid and so solicitors continue to facilitate the system to run at speed by allowing cases to be progressed, representing people when they don't have legal aid.'
relationships. Lawyers appear to feel torn between four things that can affect their work; their duties towards clients, courts, their firms and their funders (that is, the government).
Lawyers are obliged to act in their clients' best interests, while also acting as officers of the court. The contracts under which legal aid is paid also dictate conditions of defence lawyers' working practices. Lawyers conveyed that they feel their duties towards clients are compromised by both the payment regime and demands for efficiency from the courts which are reflective of governmental desires to increase efficiency. They recognise that the payment regime incentivises standardised case progression but added that uncertainty about whether or not they will be paid, alongside demands that they conduct case management regardless of funding, mean that they may make decisions which are not necessarily in the client's best long term interests. This issue is set against lawyers' acute awareness that they need to maintain a good reputation among clients to sustain their business, as well as maintain a good reputation with the court in order to retain a degree of negotiating power. However, the ability to negotiate, and thereby exercise professional decision-making skills, has been undermined by demands for efficiency, which advocates appear to feel are used to undermine respect for their professional autonomy. It seems that lawyers conduct cases when they are uncertain about payment out of a sense of professional obligation to both their clients and the courts, but they recognise that they may not always be providing a high quality service. Demands for efficiency, in conjunction with funding changes, appear to have placed greater strain on lawyers' obligations towards their clients as against their obligations to their firms and, perhaps to a lesser extent, their obligations towards the court and the government. It seems clear that lawyers feel the administrative obligations placed on them by the funding regime compromise their autonomous decision-making abilities while the payment regime itself disincentivizes meticulous case management. This undermines lawyers' ability to individualise cases in a way that would provide an ethical status to their work.
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Delay caused by the reintroduction of means testing increases uncertainty about funding for lawyers and defendants. Such delay and uncertainty affects the lawyer/client relationship in that it limits the ability of a solicitor to provide full advice at early stages in the proceedings, and potentially intensifies a 'need' to cut corners already brought about by the fixed fee system. This provides evidence of the tension placed on lawyers' self-image in terms of a desire to act in their clients' best interests which is constrained by the practicalities of conducting the work, a sense that their professional status is undervalued by government and a desire to retain credibility with both clients and their peers. It appears that these issues challenge the collective consciousness of criminal defence lawyers in the pursuit of what they perceive as their legitimate interests, through which they gain respectability. While this data is from a small sample, it supports the findings of similar studies, which suggest legal aid cuts have at least contributed to a particular crisis of professionalism about what it means to be a criminal defence lawyer.
